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INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING OF DIRECTOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL FOREIGN INFORMATION ORGANIZATION AND CONSULTANTS ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1950, IN OFFICE OF DIRECTOR (Joint IFIO-IFIS Meeting)

PRESENT: Department of State - Mr. Barrett, Director

Mr. Stone, Executive Secretary

Mr. Phillips

Mr. Oechener

Mr. Bruskin

Joint Chiefs of Staff - Admiral Stevens Department of the Army - General McClure

Col. Davis

Department of the Navy - Capt. Zondorak Department of the Air Force - Col. Dunlop

Col. Droz

Economic Cooperation Administration - Mr. Berding National Security Resources Board - Mr. Sheppard Central Intelligence to the Administration - Mr. Sheppard

Central Intelligence Agency -

25X1A

The only item on the formal agenda was discussion of the IFIS paper on National Psychological Warfare planning. Mr. Barrett announced that he wished to consider another item, procedures for the drafting and approval of IFIS projects, after the first item had been disposed of.

With respect to the item on the agenda, Mr. Barrett requested Mr. Stone to explain the three categories of planning projects in Part I of the IFIS paper on this subject, as well as the priorities in Part II of the paper. Following this presentation, Mr. Barrett requested comment on the paper.

Admiral Stevens felt that the study was an excellent working paper if it were not too rigidly held to. He questioned where the balloon study, for example, might fit into the three categories.

Mr. Barrett observed that the paper should serve as a guide rather than a formal charter or constitution for IFIS work.

General McClure asked whether B on page 2 should not read "national plan for psychological warfare" instead of "national psychological warfare plans."

25X1A said that he had several small points to make which he would take up with Mr. Stone later.

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State Department review completed

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Admiral Stevens asked whether IFIS was able to undertake more than 2 or 3 projects; if not, these projects should be carefully selected.

Col. Davis observed that the IFIS workload capability was bound up with the question of drafting and coordination procedures.

Mr. Barrett felt that once NSC 74 was out of the way, subsidiary papers under NSC 74 would be less urgent than area plans for danger spots. Col. Dunlop asked whether this meant that category 2 projects should be given priority above category 1 projects, to which Mr. Barrett replied that category 1 still came before category 2 in urgency.

Mr. Barrett felt further that any delay in getting NSC 74 out of the way should not affect work on subsidiary papers under the Plan. He stated that in all important respects the interim arrangements had been agreed upon as generally outlined in NSC 74, and that the basic assumptions with respect to responsibility in theaters and non-theaters were sufficiently well established so that subsidiary planning could proceed. As to the subsequent stages, it was agreed that there would be an interdepartmental board, but the question was unsettled as to where it would report: to State, to another department, or to the President.

Admiral Stevens thought that area situations in Korea, Indo-China and Formosa were properly top priority danger spots for planning purposes because they might lead to general war. Mr. Barrett agreed that the most urgent jobs for IFIS were clearly indicated by situations already staring us in the face. He felt that projects in category 3 should be confined to what was manifestly interdepartmental in character.

Mr. Barrett moved next to discussion of IFIS drafting and coordination procedures and requested Mr. Oechsner to present the IFIS paper. Mr. Oechsner thereupon read from the November 16 revision of Administrative Memorandum #4 concerned with the working group stage and IFIS Executive Committee stage. (Copy attached.) He noted that this Administrative Memorandum carried coordination procedured for IFIS projects only to the point at which projects were turned over to the Board. The lack of clear procedures on coordination had been largely responsible, he believed the Staff felt, for the delay in formal action on NSC 74 and the Korean Plan, which were two of IFIS principal projects. It was the Staff's desire, therefore, to get procedures agreed which might avoid these delays in the future. This was inevitably bound up with the Board's disposal of IFIS projects after it had received them; this was something on which the Staff did not feel that it should make recommendations.

Mr. Barrett felt that Board members should attempt to agree on projects referred to them by IFIS and, if they felt it necessary, get concurrences from their respective departments.

Admiral Stevens agreed and stated that it was the responsibility of the individual Board members to "stick their necks out" in taking a position on any particular project, and take personal responsibility if their position proved to be wrong. It was likewise up to the individual board member to decide whether he required further concurrence in his own department and to secure it. As far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned, Admiral Stevens was prepared to accept responsibility on this basis.

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Col. Dunlop asked at what point an IFIS project was to be considered as approved for implementation, to which Mr. Barrett replied, "After it was officially cleared by this Board."

Col. Dunlop said he felt that the Air Force would not go along with this concept unless plans were approved by the JCS.

Admiral Stevens said that he and JSPD have a charter responsibility to see that any projects approved for implementation were in conformity with Joint Wer Plans.

Mr. Barrett moved to further items for discussion, and stated that he would arrange to have the Board receive at its next meeting an interim report on the ____project. Mr. Barrett referred to the personnel roster project, stating his belief that rosters should include complete lists of those who had psychological warfare experience in World War II. General McClure stated that there was a need not only for operational personnel but for "idea men".

Col. Davis referred to the National School project and stated that the Services, in order to get on with psychological warfare training plans, required an approved planning basis, that is, NSC 74.

FCOechsner: hpt

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